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By DONALD E. KMP"
I. INTRODUCTION
A VIATION SAFETY is the Federal Aviation Administration's pri-
mary mission-a mission it shares with other federal, state, and local
governmental agencies and with the aviation community in general. Com-
plete success in this mission, the elimination of death or injury from
aviation operations, is the end toward which the agency must strive. Such
an achievement on a sustained basis, however idealistic, is the challenge
the FAA faces in the decade ahead.
To give you an idea of the operational environment in which the FAA
mission is carried out, there are approximately 118 air carriers today; they
fly 2,379 aircraft, about 6 million flight hours per year, and carry some
128 million passengers. In general aviation, there are approximately 107,000
aircraft flying 21 million flight hours. Records show some 700,000 airmen
certificated. Included also in the aviation community are about 80 prime
manufacturers, 396 subsidiary manufacturers, 260 manufacturers who
produce items under the Technical Standard Order system and 275 ap-
proved parts manufacturers. There are approximately 1,400 pilot and
mechanic schools and 2,725 repair stations. To complete the picture, the
government provides such services as flight inspection and maintenance of
some 7,200 aids to navigation, and provides air traffic control service
through some 310 airport traffic control towers, 330 flight service stations
and 28 ARTC's.
A doubling, tripling, and even quadrupling of major indicators of
aviation activity in the United States by 1979 are forecast by the Federal
Aviation Administration. Airline passengers will more than triple-from
128 million in fiscal year 1967 to 444 million in 1979. Revenue passenger
miles flown by the airlines will nearly quadruple-from 86 billion in 1967
to 342 billion in 1979. The airline fleet will increase from 2,379 aircraft
to 3,860. General aviation (non-airline) flying will show similar increases.
The general aviation fleet will almost double from 107,000 aircraft as of
1 January 1967, to 203,000 at the beginning of 1979. General aviation
flying hours will increase from 21.0 million hours to 40.5 million hours.
Use of jet fuel and aviation gasoline in the United States will more than
triple, increasing from a total of 5,403 million gallons in 1967 to 17,700
million gallons in 1979. Jet fuel consumption will increase from 4,697
million gallons to 16,890 million. Use of aviation gasoline will increase from
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706 million gallons to 810 million. Airline transport production will de-
crease from 372 to 280 aircraft, while general aviation aircraft production
will increase from 14,799 aircraft to 32,200 by 1979. Aircraft engine pro-
duction will increase from 20,812 units to 46,300 in the same time period.
Efforts in accident prevention in recent years, despite an occasional
headline-making accident, have shown encouraging results. For example,
the trend of the accident rate continues to be down, and the fluctuation
,that occurs in the rate over a stretch of years has been reduced to a very
narrow range. Some fluctuation of this kind rather than a steady downward
movement of the accident rate is almost inevitable; for, though human
error and mechanical failure are the causes to which most accidents are
traceable, the pattern in which these causes operate, along with others, is
the irregular one of chance. The trend of the rate over a period of years,
therefore, is more significant than the rate for any single year. But on
either count the latest accident statistics indicate that safety programs have
been effective.
II. THE ROLE OF THE FAA
To give you some idea of how the FAA's air safety responsibilities are
carried out, look at the air carrier operations. Starting first with the airplane
itself, our interest begins with the design standards and requirements. The
approval of an aircraft design is the responsibility of our engineering and
manufacturing personnel. They assure that provision is made for proper
design materials, workmanship, construction, and equipment. This approval
procedure is accomplished through a series of board meetings which are
composed of the various elements of engineering, such as structures, power-
plant, systems, flight test engineers and pilots with representation from
air carrier operations and maintenance specialists. Use of this procedure
assures that the aircraft meets not only design requirements and necessary
ground and flight testing, but also the needs of the air carriers from both
the operating and maintenance standpoints. The FAA operations specialist
is concerned not only with the cockpit layout, but with pilot training,
loading procedures, and weight and balance information, while the main-
tenance specialist assures the establishment of initial inspection and overhaul
times for the: aircraft structures and components.
Concurrent with the type certification process, an FAA Maintenance
Review Board is active in the development of maintenance and inspection
procedures for the aircraft. This Board works closely with the manufac-
turers of the aircraft and accessories in testing, sampling, and analyzing
to determine appropriate inspection intervals and maintenance support
programs. The FAA operational pilot specialist assigned to certification
program also serves as a member of the Flight Operations Evaluation Board
which assists in developing the operational procedures and limitations set
forth in the airplane flight manual. He is also a member of the Flight
Standardization Board which has the primary responsibility to develop




Immediately following the time when an airline makes application to
place this aircraft on their operational specification, a series of proving
flights are required by the Federal Aviation Regulations to be conducted
over the intended routes under the FAA's supervision to determine the ade-
quacy of line station facilities, crew capabilities, airport facilities, and so
forth. Once the aircraft has been placed in air carrier operation our Flight
Standards function then becomes a continuous one in the form of overall
surveillance.
As the agency responsible for certification and continued airworthiness
of the airplane, the FAA requires the air carrier operators to report certain
significant failures, malfunctions or defects daily through a report called
Mechanical Reliability Report. An analysis of these reports may result in
a maintenance or operation wire alert, an advisory circular, a manufac-
turer's service bulletin or if a design change is mandatory the FAA will
issue an airworthiness directive. Safety is not restricted to the mechanical
aspect, nor do all undesirable or potential hazards of a mechanical nature
come within the scope of the Mechanical Reliability Report. To assure
complete coverage the incident report is used to report any occurrence
or observation believed to be other than normal.
III. SAFETY AND A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT
At this point I would like to discuss a specific aircraft-the Boeing
B-727, which had enjoyed an exceptional record for the first 2 years in
operation and then in a very short period of time had 3 fatal accidents.
The first fatal 727 accident occurred 16 August 1965, to a United Air
Lines B-727 on a descent into Chicago at night under VFR conditions.
The aircraft descended below the clearance altitude and impacted in a
flat attitude approximately 20 miles short of the airport. In this partic-
ular case, the flight recorder was not recovered, thus a very valuable piece
of information was not available for the investigation. The second fatal
accident occurred 8 November 1965, to an American Airlines B-727
making a circling approach at night to a landing at Greater Cincinnati
Airport. In this accident the weather had just dropped below VFR condi-
tions due to local rain showers. The third accident occurred 3 days later,
on 11 November 1965, to a United Air Lines B-727 making an approach
under night VFR conditions landing at Salt Lake City. The aircraft im-
pacted 335 feet short of the runway threshold.
An early assessment of these accidents revealed that there were some,
common facts. All of the accidents occurred at night, with visual flight
rules weather conditions, during an aproach for landing, and there were
no visual cues (lights) on the ground and water during the approach. In
order to determine just what corrective measures were necessary to assure
safety in the B-727, the following actions were taken:
(1) Our engineering and manufacturing personnel in the Western
Region, in conjunction with the Boeing Aircraft Company, began
1968 ]
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assessing all the known facts related to these accidents.
(2) A meeting of all lead B-727 specialists was ordered by our
Deputy Administrator to be held in Los Angeles, 15 November 1965,
to discuss IFR and VFR landing approach techniques. This meeting
was chaired by Mr. James F. Rudolph, who was then chief of our
Operations Division and is now the director of Flight Standards
Service.
Mr. Rudolph met with the Air Transport Association and ALPA to
discuss the same subject. He met again with the lead B-727 specialists in
Seattle on 12 and 13 January 1966. As a result of these meetings, the
following actions were taken to ensure descent rate management and alti-
tude awareness:
(1) Each region was directed to take the necessary action to assure
that air carrier manuals and training programs applicable to the 727
adequately cover:
(a) the maximum useful rate of descent for approach and
landing (1000-1200 fpm) ;
(b) the desired rate of descent for approach and landing
(600-800 fpm) ;
(c) the corrective action the pilot must take whenever the
rate of descent is excessive within 1 mile of the landing
runway;
(d) procedures for recovery from high rates of descent; and
(e) engine spin-up times and the use of engine spin-up
curves.
(2) The principal operations inspectors assigned to turbojet opera-
tors were instructed to be sure that the manuals and training pro-
grams applicable to turbojet aircraft included the following require-
ments:
(a) During descent the pilot not flying will call out:
1. approaching 20,000 feet,
2. 1,000 feet above assigned altitude,
3. approaching 10,000 feet,
4. approaching 5,000 feet (if appropriate), and
5. 1,000 feet above initial approach altitude or 1,000
feet above field elevation for VFR approaches.
(b) On final approach upon reaching a designed altitude
(not less than 500 feet above field elevation) the pilot
not flying will call out altitude, airspeed, and rate of
descent. Thereafter, he will call out significant devia-
tions from programed airspeed and descent rates.
(c) Pilots-in-command must have at least 100 hours in the
aircraft type prior to permitting co-pilots to takeoff,
approach, or land, except when safety requires other-
wise.
(d) Each operator's training program should be amended to
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require a demonstration of recovery from high rates of
descent at low altitude to pilots-in-command initially
transitioning to turbojet aircraft and to pilots-in-
command transitioning from a turbojet aircraft with
wing-mounted engines to ones with aft-mounted en-
gines.
(e) Each operator's training program should be amended to
require each pilot-in-command transitioning to a type
turbojet aircraft to accomplish at least 35 landings in
that type before being used as pilot-in-command on
the line. At least 6 of these landings must be normal
day VFR full stop landings without reference to a
visual or electronic glide slope. Five of these must be
made at night under VFR conditions to a full stop
without using a visual or electronic glide slope.
(f) Training should be required in the use of artificial
horizons and flight directors to assure pilot familiarity
of their normal and abnormal characteristics. Special
emphasis will be placed on attitudes necessary to hold
level flight in various thrust and airplane configurations.
(3) On 7 through 9 February 1966, a team of specialists from
Washington met with the Boeing Aircraft Company and vendor
representatives at Renton, Washington. The approach taken was to
assume not only probable, but improbable type failures of any part
of the airplane or its components and determine the resulting effects.
It was concluded that there was no information available that indi-
cated that the airworthiness of the airplane, along with its systems,
instruments, and equipment could have contributed to the B-727
accidents.
(4) On 17 February 1966, a meeting was held in the FAA Wash-
ington headquarters with both domestic and foreign air carriers who
operated the B-727 to determine what failures they had encountered
and if any unusual operational occurrence had been experienced.
Again no information developed that indicated that the airplane, its
systems, instruments, or equipment could have contributed to the
B-727 accidents.
In a related connection with the Flight Control and Performance Char-
acteristics Group established following the American Airlines accident at
Cincinnati, the Allied Pilot's Association circulated a questionnaire to their
members on the B-727. The general opinion of these pilots was that the
B-727 was a good easy-to-fly operational aircraft. On 7 June 1966, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued the official report on the Salt Lake
City, Utah, accident and stated, "The Board determines the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the captain to take timely action to
arrest an excessive descent rate during the landing approach." On 7
October 1966, the CAB issued the official report on the Cincinnati acci-
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dent and stated, "The Board determines that the probable cause of this
accident was the failure of the crew to properly monitor the altimeters
during a visual approach into deteriorating visibility conditions." On
10 January 1968, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
issued the official report on the Lake Michigan accident and stated, "The
Board is unable to determine the reason for the aircraft not being leveled
off at its assigned altitude of 6,000 feet."
IV. NEw RULES
Looking now to the future, on 27 October 1967, the FAA issued a com-
prehensive set of updated crashworthiness rules designed to substantially
improve passenger survivability in the event of an accident. The FAA's
new Crashworthiness and Passenger Evacuation Standards for Transport
Category Airplanes require extensive safety improvements in both airline
equipment now in service and in designs of new planes not yet type certifi-
cated. In general, the new rules went into effect 24 October 1967. Large
capacity jets, smaller, shorter range planes and other transport category
aircraft not yet type certificated will have to meet most of the new re-
quirements to qualify for type certificates, regardless of when type certifi-
cation was originally applied for. Aircraft now in service or already type
certificated will have to meet most of the retrofit changes required under
the new rules by 1 October 1969. This lead time will give airlines enough
time to make the required modifications. There are some required modi-
fications which must be made within 12 to 18 months. Stretched versions
of current jet transports are likewise subject to the new rules.
For the first time, airplane manufacturers will have to demonstrate a
90-second emergency evacuation using a full and representative passenger
load before they will be issued type certificates. Present FAA rules require
the airlines to demonstrate passenger evacuations, allowing two minutes for
complete evacuation. Under the new rules, carriers will have to conduct
90-second evacuation demonstrations when they introduce new or sig-
nificantly modified equipment into service or when passenger seating ca-
pacity is increased by five percent or more.
Some of the improvements required in passenger transports now in
service include:
(1) By 24 October 1967:
(a) ready accessibility of all emergency exits for passenger
evacuation regardless of the number of occupants present
on any particular flight;
(b) all passenger seatbacks in upright position for takeoffs
and landings;
(c) flight attendants stationed near floor level exits and uni-
formly spaced during takeoff and landing;
(d) the passenger briefing instruction cards on emergency
evacuation procedures (located in pocket of seatback fac-




(2) By 24 October 1968:
(a) better access to overwing exits by eliminating interference
from seatback in the immediate area of exit;
(b) cabin linings with self-extinguishing properties for im-
proved resistance to fire; planes not yet type certificated
by 24 October 1967, will have such materials installed
before leaving the factory; airline transports now in serv-
ice which do not already have interiors with self-
extinguishing qualities must have them in after this date
with their first major cabin overhaul or refurbishing of
passenger cabin interior.
(3) By 24 April 1969:
(a) restraints for stowing carry-on baggage to prevent bag-
gage from creating a hazard in the event of an accident.
(4) By 1 October 1969:
(a) automatic self-supporting, 10-second escape slide from
each floor level exit in the cabin higher than six feet above
the ground (slides manufactured on or after 24 October
1967 will have to meet new standards calling for auto-
matic inflatability in not more than 10 seconds after
actuation).
(b) slip-resistant and clearly marked escape routes from each
overwing exit;
(c) emergency lighting control switch installed in passenger
cabin for operation by flight attendants-this to be an
additional switch to one now installed in pilot compart-
ment; this requirement also applies to planes not yet type
certificated;
(d) all floor level exits must meet new emergency exit require-
ments.
Airplanes which have not yet received FAA type certification must
meet the airworthiness requirements specified for transports now in service,
as appropriate. In addition, they must also satisfy various additional re-
quirements. Emergency exits in future planes must be uniformly dis-
tributed. In the case of very large transports, increased exit-to-passenger
ratios are specified. For aircraft with 300 seats or more, side exits must be
either Type I, floor level exits, which require openings at least 24 inches
wide by 48 inches high, or Type A, floor level exits, which are at least 42
by 72 inches, larger than any present emergency exits. Type A exits must
have double-width slides fully deployable in 10 seconds.
Manufacturers seeking FAA certification of additional passenger seat-
ing capability on the basis of their aircraft being equipped with ventral
exits or tail cone exits must fully qualify such exits for passenger emergency
evacuation purposes to receive such authorization.
Improved landing gear design requirements must be met for type certi-
fication, to minimize rupture of fuselage fuel lines in the event of landing
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gear failure or crash. Associated with this requirement are new rules for
better protection of fuel lines and electrical cables against fuel leakage.
Fuel lines must have sufficient flexibility and strength to allow some
stretching without leaking. Power cables must likewise have added flexi-
bility and strength and, in addition, be isolated from the fuel lines.
The new rules are based on the FAA Notices of Proposed Rule-Making
(Notices 66-26 and 66-26A) dated 29 July and 2 September 1966. These
notices were issued as a result of a public conference, extensive government
industry discussions, and special studies by FAA's Task Force for Crash-
worthiness and Passenger Evacuation.
FAA will consider additional revisions of the regulations, as advances
in the state of the art allow, to further increase the probability of pas-
senger survivability during accidents. To this end, follow-on government
and industry development programs have been established to devise new
techniques, designs, and equipment.
In progress now are programs to develop more effective self-extinguishing
characteristics for aircraft interior materials, cabin fire suppressant systems,
protection from smoke and fumes, gelled fuels, improved emergency light-
ing and exit conspicuity, and improved evacuation facilities and techniques.
I believe another example of proposed improved safety is in the flight re-
corder area. The FAA is encouraging the development of multi-parameter
(150-300) sophisticated recorders which could serve as a maintenance and
operations tool to monitor airborne performance of airplane powerplants
and systems, provide a basis for operational performance analysis, and en-
sure recording of information essential for accident investigation purposes.
The FAA, in fact, welcomes information and specific recommendations for
technically and economically feasible integration of the various presently
available and planned airborne recorder systems.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, to improve safety for our new fleet of airplanes-the air
bus, jumbo jet and supersonic transport, as well as the current fleet-the
agency and all segments of the aviation industry must work together to
achieve this goal.
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